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and Andrew  Schmitz
This  paper  examines  the  economic  impact  of the  1979 labor strike  against  lettuce
producer-shippers  in  the Imperial  Valley of California.  The  theory presented  suggests
that  formidable  problems  are  encountered  by  agricultural  labor  unions  in  obtaining
higher wages  for farm workers.  During the  1979 strike,  ironically the returns to many of
the lettuce producers  in  the Imperial  Valley  increased  substantially.
Relative to  many other parts of the United
States, California  agriculture employs a  large
amount  of farm  labor.  This is due,  in part,  to
the  large  number  of  specialty  crops  pro-
duced.  As  in  the labor-intensive  nonagricul-
tural  industries,  farm  labor  strikes  also  have
been  common;  but  relatively little  work  has
been  done  on  analyzing  their  effects.  This
paper  focuses  on  the  1979  strike  by  the
United Farm Workers  (UFW) against lettuce
producers  in  a major  lettuce-producing  area
in the United States - the Imperial Valley of
California.  The  enactment  of the  California
Agricultural  Relations  Act  of  1975  protects
the right of California  farm workers  to form a
union,  engage  in  collective  bargaining,  and
strike  in pursuit  of collective  bargaining  go-
als.  The legislation does not restrict  the time
at which a strike may be called,  including the
harvest  period.  On  December  15,  1978,
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there  was  a  termination  of  the  UFW  con-
tracts with most of the major lettuce grower-
shippers  in  the  Imperial  Valley.  Contracts
were  renewed  for  two  weeks  while  negotia-
tions took place,  but no agreement  between
the  union  and  the  grower-shippers  was
reached.  As  a result,  on January  22,  1979,  a
strike - which  is  analyzed  in  this paper  -
was sanctioned  against  lettuce  producers.
Our  results  show  that  lettuce  prices,  as
well as  short-term profits to certain  growers,
increased  substantially  as  a  result  of  the
strike.  We demonstrate  that  if a  union  is  to
strike  against  the  entire  industry  (i.e.,  all
growers simultaneously),  it must reduce  out-
put substantially  below competitive  levels  in
order to reduce industry profits  so that grow-
ers  will  have  an  economic  incentive  to
negotiate with  union  leaders.  This  is  largely
because  of the  number of lettuce producers
and shippers  and  the  relative  abundance  of
farm workers available  in the Imperial Valley
during  the  winter  season.  Reducing  output
sufficiently  is  especially  difficult  to  do  when
the number of firms  is large,  as  in the case  of
lettuce.  Hence,  a union may pursue  a policy
of  selective  striking  (i.e.,  striking  one  or
more of its firms  sequentially)  where  it only
has to  reduce  the output  (at the  extreme  to
zero)  of the  struck firm  or firms  rather  than
the  entire  industry.  However,  it  does  not
necessarily  follow  that  this  strategy  will  be
any more successful  for a union than  striking
the entire  industry.  The success  of selective
striking is  crucially dependent upon whether
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or not compensation  among  growers  is  feasi-
ble.
The Theoretical  Model
The general  framework  of analysis  for this
paper  is  displayed  in  Figure  1 where  S is  a
short-run industry  supply  curve made  up  of
more  than  a  few  firms,  D  is  the  market
demand curve,  and MR is the marginal reve-
nue  curve.  The  competitive  industry  pro-
duces  Q  at  price  P.  Interpreting  the  short-
run supply curve for the industry as the usual
summation  of  the  marginal  cost  curves  of
individual  firms,  the  quasi  rents  for  the  in-
dustry are given by Pdg.  A monopolist in the
industry  would,  of course,  equate  marginal
revenue  with  marginal costs  (assumed  to be
the same under competition  and monopoly in
this  case),  reduce  the output to Q*,  and sell
at  P*.  Monopoly  profits  would  be  given  by
P*acg.  The  gain  to  the  monopolist  can  be
expressed  as  the  difference  between  mono-
poly  rents  or  earnings  and  the  competitive
rents,  P*abP  - bcd,  which  is the lined area
minus  the  stippled  area  in  Figure  1.1  This
discussion  of the  monopoly  solution  is  rele-
vant  in  that it established  the point  of max-
imum industry profits.
Suppose  a  strike  against  the  entire  com-
petitive  industry  results  in  producers  re-
ducing  output from  Q  to  Q*.  The  effect  of
such  a strike  - if,  as a result,  the aggregate
marginal  cost curve does  not shift  to the left
- is  to  obtain  the  monopoly  rents  for pro-
ducers; that is,  producers  can  gain P*abP  -
bdc.  Thus, rather than imposing hardship on
1What the monopolist gains,  the consumer loses - and
more.  That  is,  consumer  losses  are given  by P*adP  in
Figure  1. In the lettuce case,  however,  some ambiguity
arises  since  the demand  curve  D is  a  derived  demand
curve.  Fortunately,  however,  the  lettuce industry  ap-
pears  to  satisfy  the  definition  of a vertical  market  se-
quence  as defined  by Just  and Hueth.  On the basis of
their work,  changes  in  areas under the  demand  curve
can be interpreted as  the sum  of changes in producers'
profits  for  shippers  and  retailers  plus  the  change  in
compensating  or  equivalent  variation  to  lettuce  con-
sumers.
growers,  the growers  can collectively benefit
from  a  strike.2 The  more  inelastic  the  de-
mand  at  equilibrium,  the  greater  the  re-
quired reduction in output needed  to obtain
the monopoly  solution for the industry.  This
is  shown  in  Figure  1  where  the  demand
curve  D  is  rotated  about  PQ  to  the  more
elastic demand curve D'.  Since both MR and
MR'  must  pass  through  the  midpoint  be-
tween P and d, the monopoly output implied
by D', namely  Q*', is greater than Q*.  Since
monopoly  rents  are  increasing  from  PQ  to
the  monopoly  solution,  this  suggests  that  a
strike which would be effective  in the  sense
of reducing  net  grower  returns  to  a  level
below  that which  obtains under competition
must reduce  output  more  in the  case  of in-
elastic  demand  than  in  the  case  of  elastic
demand.
From the foregoing,  it follows that produc-
ers in aggregate can  obtain substantial poten-
tial  gains  from  strike-induced  reductions  in
output  even  if the  result  is  not  exactly  the
monopoly  solution.  As  long  as  the  industry
marginal  revenue  curve,  MR(Q),  is  down-
ward  sloping  and the industry supply  curve,
S(Q),  is  upward  sloping,  the  profit  function
for the  industry,
(1)
Q
7r(Q)  =  P(Q)Q  - S(T)  dT,
0
is  concave  in Q  and has  a  maximum  at  Q*,
2The  above  analysis  assumes that consumers bid up  the
market  price until  the market clears  and that the mar-
keting  margin remains  constant.  The data suggest that
marketing  margins  of lettuce wholesalers  and  retailers
did  not  increase  during  the period  of the strike.  The
distribution  of bargaining  power  between  buyers  and
sellers  ultimately  determines  the  distribution  of  any
gains.  Another  consideration  which  arises  with lettuce
is that producers  have  incurred nonharvesting produc-
tion costs on the amount Q.  Thus,  if S'  is the marginal
cost curve exclusive of harvesting costs in  Figure 1, the
costs of producing  and harvesting  Q* are  given by  the
area under S from 0  to Q*  plus the area under S'  from
Q*  to Q.  The  increase in producer rents to the lettuce
industry in going from PQ  to P*Q* is then given by the
monopoly rents  minus the area efQQ*.
2
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Figure 1. Monopoly Solutions Under  Different  Demand  and  Supply Sitations.
the  monopoly  output.  Assuming  that
rr(O)  - 0,  one can further  observe  that con-
cavity  implies  the  existence  of a Q  < Q*  in
Figure  1  such  that  rr(Q)  =  rr(Q).  That  is,
there exists a break-even point at some quan-
tity  less  than the  monopoly  output  level
where industry profits are equal to competi-
tive profits. For  a strike to be truly successful
in the sense of reducing the collective profits
of producers, it must curtail  industry output
to less than this break-even point. In Figure
1,  any  level  of  output  between  Q  and  Q
generates  greater profits to lettuce producers
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The above  model of an industrywide  strike
assumes  that producer  costs  are  not affected
by the strike.  In other words,  the labor sup-
ply  curve  facing  the  industry  is  perfectly
wage  elastic.  In  this  case  the  workers  on
strike  can  be  replaced  by nonunion  workers
at no extra cost to the employers.  If this is not
the case,  the marginal cost curve under strike
conditions will lie above S. From  Figure 1, it
is  clear  that,  if the  strike supply  curve  is  to
the left of S, the output reduction needed  to
impose  losses  on  producers  will  be less.  In
terms of the labor supply available for lettuce
harvesting in the Imperial Valley,  we assume
it  is  wage  elastic  for several reasons:
1.  The  farm-labor,  demand-supply  situa-
tion that commonly  prevails  in the  Imperial
Valley  during the winter months  is generally
one of labor surplus.  Although  farm  employ-
ment  is  the  Imperial  Valley  reaches  a  peak
during  the  winter  months,  labor  supplies
tend  to  be  ample  during  that  season  of the
year  because,  in  part,  total  employment  of
hired  workers  in  California  agriculture  is
highest during the period from June  through
October.  During  that  period,  on  average,
about  100,000  more  workers  are  employed
than  during  the  low  period  of  December,
January,  and  February  [California  Employ-
ment  Development  Department].  Also,  be-
cause  of  the  mild  climate  in  the  Imperial
Valley  and the low ebb  in farm  employment
in other regions of the state during the winter
months,  thousands of farm workers who nor-
mally follow crop activity tend to spend much
of the  winter  in  the  Imperial  Valley,  thus
augmenting  the number  of workers  who  re-
side  in  the  Valley  year-round.  In  addition,
workers  cross  the border  legally each  day to
work  in  the  Imperial  Valley.  Some  of these
are  Americans  who  chose  to live in  Mexico,
and  some are  Mexican nationals  who possess
U.S.  permanent  immigration  visas  which
permit  the  holders  to  work  in  this  country.
Furthermore,  there  are  some  citizens  of
Mexico  who  succeed  in  crossing  the  border
and  in  obtaining  work  in  the  United  States
without appropriate  legal  documents.
2.  Proficiency of the lettuce crews tends to
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increase  as  the  members  of  the  crew  gain
experience  in  working together  and in  coor-
dinating  their  specialized  harvest  activities.
A  newly  organized,  inexperienced  crew  is
likely to be less efficient;  but the decrease  in
efficiency  is  minimal.  In  fact,  the  use of the
hiring  hall  in  recruiting  crews  implies  that
there  is  a good  deal of substitution  between
experienced  and inexperienced  labor crews.
3.  There  is  available  a mechanical  lettuce
harvester  which  is  not  yet  being  used.  The
cost  data  assembled  by  Johnson  and  Zahara
suggest  that  machines  would  already  have
replaced  workers  if very  little  substitution
between  union  and  nonunion  workers  ex-
isted.
In  the  above  context,  one  has  to justify
why costs would not increase  substantially,  if
at all, as a result of the strike. This is because
the  model  assumes  the  strike  is  industry-
wide.  However,  suppose  instead  that  the
union  selects  to  strike  only  a  few  of  the
relatively  large  producers  and  manages  to
curtail their  output  to  the level  where they
will negotiate a wage settlement.  In this case
the  nonstruck  producers  capture  the  added
profits  in Figure  1 if output falls between  Q
and Q and if the struck firms are not compen-
sated  by  the  nonstruck  producers.  In  es-
sence,  the nonstruck firms gain by behaving
as "free  riders."  In  addition,  the costs  to the
nonstruck  producers  would  not rise  as  a  re-
sult  of the  selective  strike  since  their labor
supply  is  unaffected.3 Thus,  the  notion  of a
shifting marginal cost curve for the nonstruck
firms due to the strike activity is irrelevant in
this context  since  labor costs  are  unaffected.
To  add  a further complication  to the  mod-
el,  we  must  consider  the  seasonal  nature  of
the lettuce  industry in  the context of a work-
er  strike.  Supply  and  demand  price  elas-
ticities  in  the lettuce  industry are  presented
by seasons  in  Table  1. Referring  to  Figure  1
where the  importance  of price  elasticities  of
demand  and supply was suggested,  probably
the worst season for the union to strike  (if the
30f course,  costs could rise if other inputs were not used
as efficiently  as  a result of the strike.
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TABLE  1.  Seasonal  Demand  and  Supply




Season  Elasticity  Supply
(Hd)  (us)
1  2
Winter  -0.18  0.73
Spring  -0.10  0.26
Summer  -1.43  0.48
Fall  -0.33  0.33
Source:  Thomas S.  Clevenger and W. Vernon Shelley,
"Intraseasonal  Demand-Supply  Relationships
for Lettuce,"  Proceedings of the Western  Ag-
ricultural  Economics  Association,  1974,  pp.
18-21.
action  is  against  all  of  the  growers)  is
contrary  to  intuition  - the  winter  season.
That  is,  compared  to  any  other  season,  the
winter season (because of the combined  sup-
ply and demand  price elasticities  illustrated
in Table  1) requires  the largest  reduction  in
industry output for a successful strike. Thus,
the  conditions  for  the  union  to be  effective
vary from  season  to  season  since,  for  exam-
ple,  the demand  during the winter  season  is
more  price  inelastic  than  during  other  sea-
sons  except  spring.  Particularly  for the win-
ter season,  serious questions are raised about
the  usefulness of an  industrywide  strike  as a
tool  in  this  industry  to  bargain  for  higher
wages.
The Lettuce  Industry
The above model points  out a problem for
union leaders.  If the union  strikes the entire
industry (i.e.,  all producers simultaneously),
it has  to reduce  output  substantially  before
grower profits fall.  This is difficult to do if the
union  has  many  producers  to  deal  with  be-
cause a strike against  a large number of firms
creates  organizational  problems  for  union
leaders.  On  the  other  hand,  while  a  strike
against  a few producers  is  much  easier,  the
potential  gains  could  well  be  smaller  since
each firm's demand curve  is more price elas-
tic  than  the  industry  demand  curve.  (Of
course,  the  success  of  a  strike  eventually
depends  on  whether  or  not  the  wage  in-
creases  it might  achieve from  striking  a few
firms  spread to  all of the  growers).
To aid in interpreting the empirical results
in the next section and to determine whether
or  not  the  1979  strike  was  industrywide,  a
brief  description  of  the  lettuce  industry  is
presented.  Theory itself does  not tell us  this
but does  suggest  that an industrywide  strike
may  be  futile.  The  model  in  Figure  1 can
lend itself to either an industrywide  strike or
a selective  strike  against  a few  growers,  but
the interpretation  of the results  is  quite dif-
ferent as  are the implications for a successful
union  strategy.
While  the  focus  of this paper,  because  of
recent events,  is  on the effects  of a strike  by
lettuce  pickers  on  grower  returns,  at  one
time  the  important  issues  revolved  around
the monopoly power of lettuce shed workers.
Prior  to  the  1950s,  lettuce  was  packed  in
packing  sheds  and  loaded  in  railroad  cars.
After being  loaded  into  the  railroad  cars,  it
was  covered  with  a  substantial  quantity  of
chopped  ice  and  then dispatched  to eastern
markets.  Under  collective  bargaining  con-
tracts, the shed workers obtained substantial-
ly  higher  wages  than  the  fieldworkers  who
were  not organized.
While  the  tightly  knit  labor  organization
was  of  great  benefit  to  certain  groups  of
lettuce  workers,  it  also  served  to  keep  the
rights  to production,  shipment,  and market-
ing in the hands of certain ice companies and
certain  lumber  and  labeling  companies.  Ac-
cording  to  Padfield  and  Martin,  the  shed-
technology  industry  became  a  highly  or-
ganized  group;  thus,  there was an  incentive
for  a technological  breakthrough  that would
enable growers  to  bypass  the shed complex.
Two  technological  changes  provided  the
basis  for  circumventing  the  system  - card-
board  cartons  and  the  vaccum-cooling
process.  Using  cartons  and  the  vacuum-
cooling process,  it was  possible  for  growers
and shippers  to  pack lettuce  in the field  by
utilizing workers who  were paid  lower wage
rates than  the shed workers.  Equally impor-
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tant,  it was  possible  to  avoid  the  relatively
high  overhead costs  of the packing  shed and
ice  manufacturing  process.  This  technology
opened  up  new  areas  for lettuce  cultivation
previously  locked  out  by  the  shed-centered
technology.  As the shed complex lost its pow-
er due  to the new  technology,  the  technical
elite  class  (i.e.,  the  shed  workers)  was  dis-
placed.
Currently,  lettuce  is  selectively  cut  and
packed  into a carton that is  stapled  shut  and
transported  to the  shipping point where it is
placed  in  a  large  vacuum  chamber  and
cooled.  It  is  then  removed  and  placed  in
refrigerated  trucks  or  railroad  cars  for  ship-
ment to market.  It can  also be retained for a
short period  in  cold  storage.  More  than half
of the lettuce  is  wrapped  in film before  it is
placed in the carton. The wrapping and pack-
ing  are  done  by  workers  riding  along  on  a
machine in the field, but the cooling process
is the same  in  both cases.4
The production  and sale of lettuce  can be
divided  into  the brokerage  and commission
business  and  the  integrated  production-
marketing category.  An example of the first is
Blue Anchor Company located  in  Sacramen-
to,  California,  which  sells to  wholesalers and
retailers.  It acts only as an agent and receives
a  commission  for  its  services.  Examples  of
the  integrated  production  and  marketing
businesses  are  Bud  Antle,  Inc.,  of  Salinas,
California (owned by Castle  and Cooke);  Sun
Harvest  (owned by United  Brands of Boston,
Massachusetts,  and  also  of  Salinas);  and
Bruce Church,  Inc., an independent grower-
shipper  also based  in  Salinas.
Table  2  gives  the  number  of shippers  of
California  lettuce  by  volume  handled.  Ap-
proximately  40  shippers  handle  about 75-78
percent  of  the  California  lettuce.  Thirteen
shippers  handle  about  56  percent,  and  the
4The  process  of  technological  change  in  the  lettuce
industry  probably has not run its course.  One change on
the  horizon  is  the  utilization  of  lettuce-harvesting
machines  which  are  well beyond  the  prototype  stage.
Their  acceptance and utilization  will no doubt be influ-
enced by  costs,  collective  bargaining  agreements,  the
market situation,  and other factors.
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three  largest  shippers  (Bud  Antle,  Inc.,
Bruce  Church,  Inc.;  and Sun  Harvest)  han-
dle  roughly  30  percent  of  the  volume.  To
illustrate  the  complexity  of the  structure  of
the industry,  Sun Harvest,  for example,  mar-
kets primarily the lettuce which it produces.
On the other  hand,  Bud Antle,  Inc.,  largely
contracts  with  individual  growers  to  harvest
and  market  their  lettuce  [Schaffner,
Garoyan].
The above data are important because they
suggest  that the handlers  are  not  of uniform
size and that a few firms control a large share
of the  market.  Also,  the  data  in  Table  2
should  be  compared  with  the  number  of
lettuce growers.  The 1974 Census of Agricul-
ture estimated the number of lettuce farmers
in  California  at  333  [Schaffner].  There  were
roughly  250 commercial producers of lettuce
in  1979  [Schaffner],  which  is  about  three
times  more  than  the  number  of  producer
handlers.  Hence,  because of the fewer num-
bers  of handlers  who  have  influence  over  a
large number of growers,  the union only has
to focus on this subset.  By putting,  for exam-
ple,  Bruce Church out of business for a short
period,  a  number  of producers  who  market
through  this  company  are  also  adversely  af-
fected.  In addition,  for the  union to achieve
higher wages,  it may not have  to strike all of
the grower handlers  because of the  size  dis-
tribution of these firms.  As Table 2 suggests,
13 firms  out of the 87 have over 50 percent of
the volume.
The  Impact of the  1979
Winter Lettuce  Strike
Empirical Results
The  various  accounts  of the  1979  lettuce
strike suggests that the strike was selective  in
that not all firms in the industry were struck.
(Perhaps  the  UFW  understood  the  implica-
tions,  presented  earlier,  of  an  attempted
industrywide  strike.  Furthermore,  as
discussed in  the previous section,  a few large
firms control  a substantial  portion  of the let-
tuce industry which makes  selective  striking
appear  on  the  surface  easier.)  The  largest
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TABLE 2. Number  of Shippers of California Lettuce by Volume  Handled,  1978
Cartons  Number  Cartona  Total
Handled  of Handlers  Volume  Volume
thousand  thousand  percent
1-  249  20  3,600  3
250-  999  26  22,800  19
999-1,999  28  26,400  22
2,000-2,999  10  31,200  26
3,000 +  3  36,000  30
Total  87  210,000  100
ancludes  bulk  handling  converted to  carton  equivalents - based  on 50  pounds  per carton.
Sources: David Schaffner,  "Structure  of the California Lettuce Industry,"  Ph.D. dissertation in progress,  University
of California,  Berkeley,  1980.
S. S. Johnson,  T.  Clevenger,  and  M. Zahara,  "The  United  States  Lettuce  Subsector:  Its  Structure,
Conduct,  and Performance,"  Working  Paper,  ESCS,  USDA,  1979.
lettuce  producer-shipper,  Bud  Antle  Inc.,
was  not  struck  since  it  has  labor  contracts
with the Teamsters'  Union.  Such large  firms
as  Sun  Harvest  were  struck,  but  no  state-
ments can be found that a strike  also occured
against small growers [San Francisco  Chroni-
cle,  February  24,  1979;  March  4,  1979].
The fact that the strike seemed to be selec-
tive  should  be kept  in mind  in interpreting
the  following  results.  In  this  section,  the
hypothesis  is tested that lettuce producers  in
both California and Arizona earned increased
profits  as  a  result  of the  labor  strike  in  the
Imperial Valley.  The issue of the distribution
of these  gains is  discussed later. The hypoth-
esis  is  tested  by  computing  competitive
prices  and quantities and monopolistic prices
and quantities  (i.e.,  PQ and P*Q* in Figure
1) and comparing  P*Q*  in  Figure 1 with the
actual prices  and quantities.  The time period
studied  is the month of February,  1979.
The  farm-level  supply  and  demand
parameters  of  the  U.S.  winter  crop  have
been  empirically  estimated  by  Clevenger
and  Shelley.  The  two-stage,  least-squares
procedure  utilized  for  their  parameter  esti-
mates  is  presented  in  Table  3.  These  1974
results  are  used  because,  unlike  the  model
recently  estimated  by  Hammig  and  Mit-
telhammer,  they are  estimated  for  different
seasons.  This  is important  since  the analysis
presented in this paper focuses  on the winter
lettuce crop.  Hammig and Mittelhammer ob-
tained  (1)  a  price  and  income  elasticity  of
domestic  demand  of  -.  1223  and  .1827,  re-
spectively;  (2) a price  and income  elasticity of
export demand  of  -. 1016 and  .675,  respec-
tively;  and  (3) a  price  elasticity  of supply  of
.417.  These average elasticities fall within the
range  of  seasonal  elasticities  estimated  by
Clevenger  and Shelley.
By  substituting  relevant  1978  data for the
variables  DI,  AP,  Y,  and  M,  the  intercept
terms  for  the  supply  and demand  equations
in Table 1 were adjusted to correspond to the
1979 winter  season;  and the  equations  were
expressed as functions of P and Q only.  These
adjusted  equations  serve  as  the basis  for the
empirical  estimates  of the welfare  effects  of
the lettuce  strike. The adjusted supply equa-
tion  is
(2)  Ps  =  -3.15983  +  .0005828Q,
and the demand  equation  is
(3)  Pd  =  45.8996  - .0023Q.
For  competitive  equilibrium,  a  single
price,  P, must prevail since the commodity is
assumed  to  be  homogeneous.  The  quantity
demanded,  Q,  for  the  winter  season  must
7
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TABLE 3.  Estimated  Coefficients of a Supply and  Demand  Model  of the  U.S.  Winter  Lettuce
Crop
Demand:  Pt  =  7.9283  - .0023 Qt  + .0057 Dlt_/4  + .6165Mt- 1
(-2.68)a  (2.65)  (2.15)
Supply: Qt  =  -12,857.3813  + 1,715.8502  Pt  + .1177 APt  + 48.9457 Yt_1
(5.94)  (5.04)  (4.52)
where:
Q  =quantity  of U.S.  lettuce supplied  (100,000 pounds)
DI = U.S.  disposable personal  income per capita (dollars)
M  =average  retail  marketing  margin for  lettuce (dollars per head)
Y= average  lettuce yield per harvested  acre (100  pounds)
AP= acres planted  to  lettuce (acres)
P= average farm  price  per hundredweight  of lettuce (dollars)
t= present  lettuce season
aFigures  in parentheses are t ratios.
Source:  Thomas  S. Clevenger  and  W.  Vernon  Shelley,  "Intraseasonal  Demand-Supply  Relationships  for
Lettuce," Proceedings of the Western Agricultural Economics Association, 1974,  pp.  18-21.
equal  the  quantity  supplied  at  the  equilib-
rium price,  P.  From  (2) and  (3),  this  implies
(4)  P  =  6.758 and  Q  =  17,017.
Evaluated  at  the perfectly  competitive  solu-
tion  (4),  the  demand  elasticity  for  winter
lettuce  is  estimated  to  be  -. 17  and  the
supply  elasticity  to  be .68.
Consider  a market with inverse supply and
demand  curves,
(5)  Pd  =  ac - PQ and  P,  =  y  +  AQ.
Now  suppose  that  one  firm  takes  control  of
the  production  of lettuce  and chooses  to  act
as  a monopolistic  firm.  From  (5),  the mono-
polist's  profit  function  can  be  expressed  as
7T(Q)  =  (a( - y) Q  - (P  +  6/2) Q2. The first-
order  condition  is  that  marginal  revenue
equals marginal  cost which implies
(6)  P*  =  24.123  and  Q*  =  9,465.
To  test the hypothesis  that  the union  has
yielded  substantial  monopoly  rents  to  grow-
ers,  P*  and Q*  should be compared with the
actual  prices  and quantities which  prevailed
in  the  lettuce  market  in  February,  1979.
However,  since  Q*  corresponds  to  the  op-
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timum  monopoly  shipments  for  the  entire
1979  winter  season,  this figure  must be  ad-
justed  to  represent  an  estimate  of  the  op-
timum  February  shipments.  Since the  Feb-
ruary  lettuce  shipments  have  averaged  33
percent  of winter  shipments  for  the  past
three years,  Q* was deflated  to 33 percent of
its value  shown  in  (6).  Therefore,  if the let-
tuce  monopoly  had  formed  in  February,
1979,  it  would  have  shipped  312  million
pounds  of lettuce  and  would  have  charged
$24.10  per  hundredweight.  Assuming  mar-
ket shares  remain constant under the mono-
polist,  93  percent  of this output  or 290  mil-
lion  pounds would  be  shipped from  Califor-
nia and Arizona. This  result is very similar to
the  actual  marketing  statistics  in  Table  4.
During the last week of February,  the  mar-
ket price  was virtually  identical to the mono-
poly price  estimated  from  equations  (2)  and
(3).  Presumably,  as  a result of the  strike,  the
California and Arizona producers were forced
to reduce their shipments  in February,  1979,
to 329 million pounds. 5 However,  due to the
5The reduction  in lettuce  shipments  in February,  1979,
from  both  California  and  Arizona  producers  over  the
same  period  in  1978  may  have  been  partially  due  to
factors  other  than  the  strike,  such  as  the  weather.
However,  the contention  here  that the  strike  did  not
impinge  hardship  on  the producers  still  holds.
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TABLE 4.  Comparative  Lettuce Marketing  Statistics, February,  1978 and  1979
Rail  and Truck Shipments  of  Lettuce
California and  Arizona  Price of  Lettuce
1978  1979  1978  1979
1,000 pounds  $/cwt. f.o.b.  Imperial  Valley
February
1  21,760  23,540  12  20-24
2  21,720  18,378  10  20
3  26,340  6,888  10  a
4  17,180  4,250
5  2,120  15,010  20
6  22,730  14,816  10  20
7  24,690  14,802  9-10  20
8  2J,040  15,574  8-9  16-20
9  22,370  17,150  8-9  16-20
10  21,300  9,188  8-9
11  15,040  1,080
12  590  6,100  --b
13  19,400  16,852  8-9  24
14  21,450  5,300  7-8
15  20,870  18,202  6-7  24
16  23,180  17,474  6-7  20
17  22,990  11,488  6-7
18  14,200  1,620
19  50  9,150
20  15,830  11,812  16
21  20,420  11,422  6  20-24
22  21,790  14,702  6  24
23  24,120  16,852  6  24
24  24,940  9,626  6
25  14,990  800
26  100  13,332  24
27  22,590  9,978  6  24
28  22,820  13,654  5-6  24
aBlanks indicate  no price quoted  for weekend  or holiday
bDashes  indicate that supplies were insufficient to quote.
Source:  California  Bureau  of  Market  News,  Federal-State  Market  News Service,  "Central  California  Vegetable
Report"  (Salinas,  February,  1978  and  1979).
relatively  inelastic  demand  for  lettuce,  they
were  able  to obtain  an average  of $21.40 per
hundredweight  for this period.
An estimate  of the welfare gain accruing to
the  California and  Arizona lettuce producers
during  the  February  part  of  the  strike  is
shown in Table  5  to be  $41.6 million.6 This
estimate  corresponds  to  the  area
6In terms of the impact of the strike among growers, it is
clear  that part  of the  estimated  gains went  to Arizona
lettuce producers  since they received  the higher price
without having to  cut output.  Since  Arizona producers
were  outside  the  affected  strike  area,  they  benefited
solely as free  riders.
(P*abP)  - (bdc)  - (efQQ*) in Figure  1 and
was  computed using the observed prices and
quantities  reported  in Table 4.
If the  industry  were  monopolistic,  the
maximum  net  producer  benefit  obtainable
for this period would have been $45.4 million
for  California  and Arizona  producers.  Even
though  the  actual  producer  returns  were
$41.6  million  and  were  thus  less  than  the
monopoly optimum, they still represent very
substantial short-run returns for producers in
the lettuce industry.  Since California produc-
ers supplied  79  percent  of the  U.S.  lettuce
market during February and Arizona produc-
ers supplied,  on the average,  14 percent over
9
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the past three years,  the estimated  producer
"monopoly"  returns,  in  the  time  period
studied,  are  $34.5  million  in  California  and
$7.1  million in Arizona.
Data  in Table  5  indicate  that  output  was
reduced by roughly 35 percent from the com-
petitive quantities that would  have prevailed
under  normal yield  assumptions.  This  is  en-
tirely consistent with the data in Table 2.  The
struck firms,  such as Sun  Harvest,  make  up a
large  percent  of the  industry partly  because
of  their  capacity  as  handlers.  In  addition,
plantings were lower in  1978 due to weather
conditions  which  yielded  a  lower  crop  in
1979.  Lettuce  acreage  in the Imperial Valley
was 43,900,  41,170,  and  40,860,  respective-
ly,  in  1976,  1977,  and  1978  [Agricultural
Commissioner,  Imperial County, California].
Therefore,  our estimates  of increased profits
as  a result of the strike  should be viewed  as
an  upper bound  because  part of the  reduc-
tion  may  well  have  been  due  to  reduced
plantings.  In addition,  when interpreting the
empirical  results,  the following  assumptions
are important:  (1) previously estimated linear
supply and demand equations were used and
extrapolated  outside of the data range;  (2) the
short-run  supply curve  used  is  quite  elastic
(it may  well  be,  given  the  harvesting  prac-
tices  in  lettuce);  (3)  the  harvesting  and mar-
keting costs used per carton of lettuce did not
change  as  a  result of the  strike;  and  (4) the
lettuce industry  was competitive  prior to the
strike.  Several of the assumptions  may exagg-
erate  the  effect  of  the  increase  in  grower
returns due to the labor strike.  For example,
costs  were  probably  raised during the  strike
because,  typically,  grocery  retailers  and
other handlers  increase their marketing mar-
gins  when  supply  is  short.  In  addition,  the
issue of the competitive  nature of the lettuce
industry  has  been  raised  in  the  past  [e.g.,
Northern California Supermarkets v.  Cen-
tral California  Lettuce Producers et al.]  and
is  still  controversial.  However,  even  if the
industry  is  noncompetitive,  increased  re-
turns  still could  accrue  to  growers  due  to  a
labor strike;  but the magnitude would  be far
less.
The Distributional  Issue
Because  the  lettuce  strike  was  selective
(not all  of the grower-shippers  were  struck),
producers  were  affected  differently.  Firms
such  as  Sun  Harvest  may  actually  have  lost
from  the strike  [Schaffner].  If this were  the
case, then the profits earned due to the strike
(i.e.,  those  which  resulted  because  output
was reduced by the strike below competitive
levels,  causing lettuce  prices  to rise sharply)
accrued  to  the  free  riders.  These  were  the
Arizona producers and the nonstruck Califor-
nia  producers.  However,  one  should  view
TABLE  5.  Estimated  Strike  Gains to  the  California  and  Arizona  Lettuce  Producers  for the
Month  of February,  1979
Net Producer
Prices  Quantities  Gain
100,000  million
$/cwt.  pounds  dollars
Optimal
Competitive  6.7  5,222.8  0
Values  (P)  (Q)a
Optimal
Monopoly  24.1  2,905.0  45.4
Values  (P*)  (Q*)a
Observed
Statistics  21.4  3,290.3  41.6
aThese  estimated  quantities  have  been  twice  deflated.  First,  they  were  deflated  by  67  percent  in order  to
represent  February quantities.  Secondly, they were deflated  by 7 percent  in order to  represent California  and
Arizona quantities.
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this  interpretation  with  caution.  It rules  out
the  possibility  that  nonstruck  firms  actually
compensated  the  struck  firms.  Also,  since
strike  insurance  was  available,  firms  struck
may  not  have  been  made  worse  off in  that
they  had  not  received  direct  compensation
from  growers.  If  growers  contribute  to  a
strike  fund,  it  is  clear  that  our  theoretical
analysis  of an industrywide  strike  still holds.
That is,  the reduction  in output of the struck
firms resulted in  an increase  in industry pro-
fits of sufficient  magnitude  to allow  compen-
sation  so  that all producers  could have  been
made better  off.  It follows  that,  with a com-
pensation  scheme among growers, the empir-
ical analysis presented above is independent
of the  striking strategy  of the  union  con-
sidered in this paper (i.e.,  entire industry
versus selective  strikes),  given the  assump-
tions made.
There  may  be  one  interesting  difference
between  an  industrywide  strike  and a selec-
tive  strike  when  compensation  is  possible
among  growers  through  such  devices  as
strike  insurance.  This  relates  to  the  discus-
sion  earlier  about  the  supply  curve  of labor
facing  the  industry.  If  there  is  not  a  high
degree  of substitution  between  union  and
nonunion  lettuce  pickers  (even  though  this
analysis  argues  that there  is),  then an  indus-
trywide  strike  causes  costs  to  rise in produc-
ers.  However,  as  already  pointed  out,  a
selective  strike  does  not  cause  this  problem
since  the  supply  curve  of labor  for the  non-
struck firms  is unaffected.  Thus,  profits to all
producers  could  actually  be  higher  under  a
selective  strike  as  opposed  to  an  industry-
wide  strike.  If compensation  is  not possible,
some producers will gain and others will lose
in  the short  run.  Net  industry  gains  are  still
positive  for  the  same  reasons  as  above.
Therefore,  in terms  of our empircial  results,
the only  change  implied  under our assump-
tions  is  that  the  profits  are  going  to  fewer
firms in  the industry.  That is,  the magnitude
of profits  is  not  affected  only  their  dis-
tribution.  It must  be emphasized,  however,
that  these  results  are  of a  short-run  nature
and may  not apply  to the long run.
A  Consumer Boycott  As  an
Alternative  to  a Worker Strike
In addition to  strikes,  the lettuce  industry
has  commonly  experienced  consumer  boy-
cotts  [San  Francisco  Chronicle,  April  27,
1979].  As a result, it is interesting to compare
theoretically  the effects  of a strike  with those
of  a  consumer  boycott.  A  strike  essentially
focuses on restricting producer output direct-
ly,  whereas  a consumer boycott is  concerned
with  shifting the  demand  curve  for the final
product  to the "left."  Suppose  that consum-
ers boycott  the market,  as  displayed  in  Fig-
ure  2,  to  such  an  extent  that  the  demand
curve  shifts  from  acD  back  to  ao'D'.  The
effects of such a boycott,  ceteris paribus, are
detrimental  to  the  producers  of the product
in  question.  Suppose,  however,  that  in  re-
sponse  to the boycott,  the producers  collec-
tively decide  to monopolize the industry set-
ting  a'MR'  =  -S  to  yield  P'  and  Q'  as  the
new  equilibrium. 7 At  the  new  equilibrium
solution,  the producers have  lost rents equal
to the  area  GFJ (Figure  2)  and gained  rents
equal  to P'd  EGPC  vis-a-vis the  competitive
solution. Their net welfare gain is,  therefore,
P'd EGPc  - GFJ  =Z
From the diagram,  it is  clear that produc-
ers  "lose" as a result of a boycott if area Z  < 0
(i.e.,  if  GFJ  >  P'd  EGPC)  even  if they  re-
taliate  and  subsequently  form  a  monopoly.
Producers  are  worse  off  with  the  "boycott
monopoly"  situation  if consumers  choose  to
shift the demand curve  far enough to  the left
to yield  a negative  value  for Z.  In the analy-
sis,  Z  =  0 is  analogous  to  the notion  of the
strike break-even  point raised  earlier  in  this
paper.  Thus,  a boycott  can be equally  harm-
ful, or even more harmful,  to producers  than
a strike.  Whether or not one  is preferable  to
the  other  is  a  function  of the  parameters  of
the  market  supply  and  demand  curves  and
the  objectives  of the  union-consumer  coali-
tion.
7The  suggestion  of a producer  monopoly  in  the lettuce
industry  is not  entirely unrealistic.  This possibility  has
been  alluded  to  by  Hammig  and  Mittelhammer  who
state  that this industry  presents an  opportunity  for the
extraction  of above-normal  profits.
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Figure 2. A Work Strike and  Boycott Compared.
Conclusions
This  analysis  shows  that  substantial  in-
creases in revenue were generated  to lettuce
producers  in aggregate  during the  1979  let-
tuce  strike  in the  Imperial  Valley of Califor-
nia  even though some  of the producers  may
have  experienced reduced sales.  In essence,
a  strike - by  reducing  output  - does  not
12
necessarily  hurt  all  producers  in  the  indus-
try. The reduction in output during the strike
was  comparable  to  the  action  a  monopolist
facing  an  inelastic  demand  would  take  -
namely,  reduce  output  from  competitive
levels  and  increase  price.  The  reduction  in
output during  the  strike was  in part  due  to
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lettuce-producer shippers rather than the en-
tire  industry.  It is  clear that  the free  riders
benefited  from  this  reduction  in  output,  at
least in the short run.  What is not clear is the
effect  of  the  strike  on  the  firms  that  were
actually  struck.
To  contend,  as  this analysis  suggests,  that
UFW strike  action  resulted in  economic  ad-
justments  similar  to  those  that  might  be
made by  a monopolist  would seem  to many
somewhat  unreal.  Yet,  as  has  been  demon-
strated in  this paper,  if the struck  firms had
ways  of  being  compensated  for  their  losses
(e.g.,  strike  insurance),  then  all  producers
gained  from  the  strike;  and  the  analysis
would  be comparable to the behavior  of one
or two  large  oligopolistic firms  (the strike  in
essence then serves as a vehicle for monopol-
istic-type  economic  adjustments).  Explicit
compensation  is  illegal  among  growers;
hence,  it may be unreasonable  to argue  that
compensation  schemes  exist  so  that  the
struck firms can  recoup their losses.  Yet,  it is
interesting to observe the length of time that
elapsed  between  the  strike and  the negotia-
tion  of new wage contracts  by  such  firms  as
Sun  Harvest  [Imperial  Valley  Press;  Sac-
ramento  Bee].  In  fact,  the  account  of  Sep-
tember,  1980,  suggests  that only  2  of the  11
firms  struck  agreed  on  a  new  wage  settle-
ment.  As this paper shows,  the UFW is in an
extremely  difficult  position  to  bargain  for
higher wages because  of the structure  of the
lettuce  industry,  including  the nature of de-
mand for the product.
In  addition  to the  problems  faced  by the
UFW,  as  alluded  to in this paper,  there are
additional  elements  in  the  bargaining  situa-
tion  which  make  it  difficult  for  labor  to  de-
mand higher wages  even if no compensation
scheme  exists among  growers.
1. The  large  lettuce  growers produce  let-
tuce  during other  times  of the  year in  areas
outside  the  Imperial  Valley.  Thus,  they  are
likely  to  find  that  the pattern  of wage  costs
established  in  the  Imperial  Valley  also faces
them  in  Salinas  and  other  regions  of the
state,  increasing  their  resistance  to  union
demands.
2.  In periods of excess production,  market
prices  may  fall  so  low  that  fields  remain
unharvested  and/or  are  disced  up  because
market  prices  will  not  cover  harvest  and
transportation  costs.  The  result  is  reduced
supplies  going  to market.
3.  Some of the large lettuce firms produce
other vegetable crops and hence spread their
risks over several commodities and activities.
This  enables  them  to  take  a  tougher  stand
against  union  demands  since  they can  cover
short-term  losses  on  lettuce  from  other
sources.
4.  Because  of their  access  to  captial,  the
relatively large firms are in a more  favorable
position to adopt a new laborsaving technolo-
gy - the mechanical  lettuce  harvester.  This
possibility  certainly  puts  an  upper  limit  on
the bargaining strength  of unions.  Of course,
a  union  that  included  other  workers  in the
harvesting  process  - particularly  cooler
operators  and truck  drivers - would  be in a
position  to  restrict  the  introduction  of new
technology,  at least  in the  short run.
In  conclusion,  the analysis  in this paper is
static  and  of  a  very  short-run  nature.  As  a
result,  it cannot predict the long-run implica-
tions of the effects of union  strategy on union
wages  and  grower  returns  (e.g.,  because  of
the  multiproduct  nature  of the  firms,  a  shift
in  the  share  of returns  to  workers  from  let-
tuce  production  would  make  less  labor-
intensive  crops  relatively  more  attractive).
The  short-run  focus  of  this  paper  possibly
overstates the benefits  to growers from work-
er strikes.  In the long run it is possible for the
strike-related profits  calculated  in this  paper
(appropriately  discounted)  to go to producers
and workers jointly;  this will have an adverse
effect  on  consumers  because  the  combined
producers  and  workers  will  have  secured  a
monopoly  position.  (The  analysis  in  this  pa-
per  suggests  there  are  rents  for workers  to
obtain from growers,  but the question is how
to  obtain  them.)  However,  in  spite  of  its
short-run  nature,  it is  hoped that the frame-
work  presented  here  can  be  used  as  a  first
step in  analyzing the impacts  of labor strikes
in  agriculture  and  that  this  type  of analysis
13
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will be extended to consider long-run  effects
on consumers,  where  the  relative  strengths
of growers  versus  unions  is considered.  Re-
sults from such  analysis would be interesting
and are  urgently needed.
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